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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: My name is Daniel V. 
Yager. I am a partner in the law firm of McGuiness & Williams and serve as the 
Assistant General Counsel for the Labor Policy Association, an organization of the senior 
human resource executives of more than 200 major U.S. companies. I appear before you 
today on behalf of a group of management attorneys calling itself "The Working Group." 
The attorneys in our group include: Vincent J. Apruzzese of Apruzzese, 
McDermott, Mastro & Murphy; Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. of O'Melvaney & Myers; Robert 
S. Carabell, Senior Counsel, TRW, Inc.; William J. Curtin of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius; 
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William Kilberg of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Charles A. Powell III of Powell, Tally & 
Frederick; and Ezra Singer, Assistant General Counsel — Human Resources, GTE 
Corporation. 
We were assembled last fall by your Commission's counsel, Prof. Paul C. Weiler, 
to discuss with him the views of management attorneys on the various issues being 
considered by the Commission. At Professor Weiler's invitation, we appear before you 
today to discuss our views on the legal issues surrounding employee involvement (EI). 
Employee involvement is a topic about which the President, Secretary Reich, 
Chairman Dunlop, NLRB Chairman-designate Gould, and human resources experts 
agree. It is a vital policy matter and one of great concern to all Americans committed to 
enhancing our competitiveness in a global economy. A strong and clear recommendation 
by this Commission would be of immeasurable value in supporting and guiding our 
national policy. 
Our Group has developed a consensus position on this issue, which we urge this 
Commission to consider and adopt. I quote: 
Electromation and its progeny have had a chilling effect on employers' willingness 
to initiate and/or continue employee participation committees, at the very time 
these committees have become widely recognized as a major means of improving 
productivity and enhancing product quality. Electromation must be clarified or 
changed to assure continued employee participation. 
To understand how the law has reached its current state, I will first attempt to put 
the issue in its historical context, then discuss where the former NLRB went badly awry. 
Finally, I will suggest why the Working Group believes it imperative that this Commission 
issue a strong statement endorsing a policy by the Administration which supports 
employee involvement without legal impediment. 
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Before discussing the law itself, however, we want you to be aware that 
management attorneys today face a serious dilemma when it comes to employee 
involvement. We watch as our clients continue to move towards what are called 
"horizontal" or "lateral organizations" where employees at all levels of the enterprise are 
given a greater voice in all aspects of the operations. Our clients are doing this for one 
primary reason — to make themselves more competitive in the global marketplace — 
indeed, in many cases, to ensure their survival. Meanwhile, employees enjoy a greater 
sense of fulfillment in their work and identify themselves more with the well-being of the 
enterprise. The end result is a "win-win" situation for both the company and its 
employees. 
v. 
To say that those clients who have moved towards horizontal organizations are 
happy with them would be a serious understatement. Their feelings go beyond happiness 
to a deep commitment to what began as an organizational restructuring and is now a 
whole new way of life. 
Yet, we, as their attorneys, have to be the bearer of bad news. We have to tell 
them that their "way of life" is in serious legal jeopardy under our labor laws. We have 
to tell them that, even though they are empowering their employees, they may not be 
doing it in a manner sanctioned by the law — i.e., through collective bargaining with a 
labor union acting as the exclusive representative of their employees. 
As their legal advisors, we face a predicament. Generally, we caution our clients 
to stay on the "safe side" of the law, but in this case that may mean telling them to 
dismantle quality, efficiency, productivity, and success in a global marketplace. I want to 
assure you that we cannot and do not advise our clients to support or assist company-
dominated unions to meet this need. 
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Allow me to address how we got into this quandary in the first place. 
Employer-Dominated Company Unions. As you know, the predominant method of 
human resource management in the early part of this century was "Taylorism." Named 
after Frederick Taylor, this management approach was characterized by top-down 
decisionmaking, beginning with the CEO or President and flowing down through middle 
management to the shop foreman. By the time you got to the shop floor, most of the 
decisions were made and the line employee was simply supposed to do as he was told. 
In the early 20th Century, this made for a very efficient system and helped the United 
States achieve industrial and commercial supremacy throughout the world. 
Obviously, this left the employee at the bottom of this hierarchy with little or no 
V. 
power over workplace decisionmaking. The only way he or she could achieve any 
influence was by banding together with all other employees and forming a labor union to 
go to management and say: "Bargain with us or you will have no workers to run your 
plant." 
Just as this concept had great appeal to the powerless line employee, it had little 
or no appeal to management in companies steeped in the Taylorist approach where only 
management called the shots. Thus, these companies resisted the union movement. 
This resistance came in a variety of forms. One of the most effective was to 
establish an alternative "company union" that had all of the superficial trappings of a 
union, but which, in fact, was under the complete control of management. 
A 1935 study of 126 of these "company unions" by the Bureau of Labor Statistics1 
identified a number of their common characteristics: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Company Unions (1937). 
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• formed in response to a strike or strong trade union support in the 
plant or locality; 
• no secret ballot election of the union or its officers; 
• coercive tactics used by management to get employees to join the 
union; 
• absence of any written collective bargaining agreement; 
• few or no meetings of employee members; 
• absence of the use of strikes or other economic weapons;2 and, 
• the absence of any meaningful negotiations, or even discussions, 
between unions and management. 
This last characteristic is perhaps the most significant, demonstrating that the 
typical "company union" was little more than a ruse to try to divert support for a labor 
union to something posing no threat to management's Tayloristic approach to doing 
business. Thus, the employees were left with no genuine voice in workplace matters. 
Section 8(a)(2). The threat posed by employer-dominated company unions to 
legitimate collective bargaining was a key focus of the Congress in enacting the Wagner 
Act of 1935. Experience under the Railway Labor Act had shown that the absence of a 
specific prohibition against company unions could result in their further proliferation. 
In one of the two instances of strikes, the strike was called as a one-day protest over a regional 
Labor Board (Le, under the National Industrial Relations Act) order of r ^statement of dismissed trade 
union members. One of the strikers noted: "The superintendent told th 'orkers it would be a good time 
to show their strength." 
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Thus, it was decided specifically to prohibit the formation and operation of such 
unions as a separate unfair labor practice.3 More significantly, the Congress, in 
prohibiting the domination of a "labor organization," defined the latter term broadly to 
include: 
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or 
conditions of work.4 
At the time, the breadth of this definition caused little concern since only two 
forms of employee organizations "dealing with" employment conditions were envisioned: 
legitimate trade unions and employer-dominated company unions. Any attempt by the 
Congress to draft narrower language would only have served as an invitation to 
employers at the time to craft alternatives that didn't "look like a duck" but could still 
swim, fly and quack. 
Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2). An examination of the early NLRB case law 
demonstrates that the Board took very seriously its mission to eradicate sham company 
unions. The very first case reported by the NLRB involved an employer-dominated 
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: 
[It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer] to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; Provided, 
That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 6, an 
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working 
hours without loss of time or pay. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 
Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act; 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). 
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"company union"5 and about one out of every five cases in the early years involved 
enforcement of a complaint against such a practice. 
This aggressive pursuit by the Board — and the increased sophistication of 
employees as to their rights under the labor laws6 — resulted in the virtual elimination 
of "sham" company unions. Section 8(a)(2) cases have dwindled in recent years to fewer 
than one in twenty, with those cases often involving an employer favoring one 
independent union over another. 
While the law achieved its purpose in exterminating sham company unions, its 
language permitted an unfortunate side effect — a broad, mechanistic interpretation of 
Section 8(a)(2) which now extends well beyond the sham company unions 8(a)(2) was 
designed to prevent. 
This "mechanistic" approach has evolved as a result of two strains of 
interpretation: 
1) a broad reading of the term "labor organization" to encompass almos" any 
structure where employees and management discuss7 and try to resolve 
issues directly related to or affecting working conditions; and, 
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 NLRB 1 (1935). 
As early as 1947, NLRB Chairman Herzog observed: 
This is 1947, not 1935; in the interim employees have learned much about protecting their own 
rights and making their own choices with the full facts before them. 
Detroit Edison, 74 N.L.R.B. 267, 279 (1947). 
A critical issue in this determination is the scope of the phrase "dealing with." The Supreme 
Court held, in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959), that the phrase was broader than negotiating a 
collective bargaining agreement but failed to provide further guidance other than to state it did not include 
mere communication between employers and employees in a non-representative manner. 
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2) a total disregard for the employer's motives or the employees' desires in 
determining whether unlawful "domination" has occurred. 
While the Board has contended that it has applied the law based on the "totality 
of the circumstances,"8 its approach has been more accurately described by some 
observers as a "per se" approach,9 and there is ample case law to illustrate this 
characterization.10 
The federal courts generally have deferred to the Board in these determinations, 
but there have been noteworthy exceptions.11 The Sixth Circuit, in particular, has led 
the way in adopting an approach that focuses on whether "employee choice" as to union 
representation has been inhibited, rather than using a "checklist" approach.12 
Electromation. The collision between EI and Section 8(a)(2) was a long-
anticipated one. For several years prior to the 1992 Electromation decision, law review 
articles and speeches by labor law experts (including NLRB members) questioned 
whether the committees typically used in EI settings were in fact employer-dominated 
labor organizations. These committees exhibited a number of the critical elements, 
8
 Coamo Knitting, 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 582 (1964). 
9 
Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 Yale L.J. 510, 516 
(1973). 
10
 See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1966); Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012 
(1967); Merrill Transp. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1963); Kunst, 100 N.L.R.B. 146 (1952), enforced, 202 F.2d 
846 (6th Cir. 1953).; Standard Transformer Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 669 (1951); Crowley Milk Co., Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 
1049 (1950), modified, 208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953); Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 198 N.L.R.B. 891 
(1972). 
11
 See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), denying enforcement to 206 
N.L.R.B. 191 (1973), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 
(7th Cir. 1955). 
1 2
 See Modern Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 
724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968). 
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including discussions between employees and management representatives about 
"conditions of employment," which the Board had found unlawful in its 8(a)(2) decisions. 
In fact, most attorneys familiar with Section 8(a)(2) recognized that, if employee 
involvement structures were going to have a "safe harbor," the Board's "mechanistic" 
approach to Section 8(a)(2) must be modified. 
Thus, when the Board announced in 1991 that it was going to confront the issue 
squarely,13 there was a mixture of relief and anxiety among management attorneys. We 
were relieved that the issue was finally going to be addressed by the Board, but anxious 
because, unless the Board adopted a new approach, it would only invite a stream of 
unfair labor practice charges against a critical element of our clients' urgent need for 
competitiveness. Meanwhile, there was also some concern that the facts in Electromation 
did not appear to represent a typical EI situation,14 and thus its value as a test case 
seemed minimal. 
On May 14, 1991, the Board announced it would conduct a hearing in the Electromation case 
and invited participants to address two questions: 1) At what point does an employee communication lose 
its protection as a communication device and become a labor organization? 2) What conduct of an 
employer constitutes domination or interference with the employee committee? 
14 
In response to human resource tensions, Electromation formed five Action Committees to 
consider certain specifically defined issues (Absenteeism/Infractions, No Smoking Policy, Communication 
Network, Pay Progression for Premium Positions, and Attendance Bonus Program). The committees were 
formed without knowledge on the part of the Company that the Union had begun an organizing effort 
among its employees. Each of the committees was made up of six hourly employees and one or two 
management personnel, plus one management person who would sit on each to ensure coordination among 
them. Employees interested in serving on a committee were invited to sign up on volunteer sheets, with 
selection being made by management from the volunteers. Each of the volunteers was placed on at least 
one committee but, in order to give everyone a chance, some were not able to serve on all of the 
committees for which they volunteered. The employee members of the committee were active participants, 
and there was no evidence of any complaints or that the discussions were dominated by management 
representatives. When the company later learned that a union was seeking recognition, it withdrew from 
participation in the committees, but informed the employee members that they could continue to meet if 
they so wished, which some did. When the union lost the election, it filed a charge alleging that the 
Action Committees violated Section 8(a)(2). 
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There was some reason for hope. Indeed, the Board previously had given its 
blessings to certain types of EI by excluding them from the definition of "labor 
organization": 1) employer-employee grievance committees performing a purely 
adjudicatory function;15 2) autonomous teams of employees to whom management 
delegated its authority, instead of "dealing with" them;16 and 3) committees which 
discussed productivity issues without delving into terms and conditions of employment.17 
These cases protected some EI structures, but we knew that they didn't go nearly 
far enough to provide the necessary protection. Our hope was that the Board would 
follow the 6th Circuit line of cases and interpret Section 8(a)(2) according to its intent — 
to guarantee employees' freedom of choice as to whether to be represented by a union 
for purposes of collective bargaining.18 Where the EI structure in question does not 
inhibit that free choice there should be no violation. Indeed, we hoped that the Board 
would recognize that legitimate EI structures actually achieve the underlying purposes of 
the statute by empowering employees (although perhaps not in a form recognizable to 
Senator Wagner). 
Unfortunately, our hopes were in vain. Instead of adapting the 1930's law to the 
needs of the 1990's and beyond, the Board reasserted its traditional mechanistic 
approach. Meanwhile, it only added further confusion by including three separate 
15
 Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977); Mercy Memorial Hospital, 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 
(1977). 
16
 General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). 
17
 Sears Roebuck & Co., 21A N.L.R.B. 230 (1985). 
18 * 
Several briefs amicus curiae were filed with the Board urging such an approach, including briefs 
filed by ten members of Congress, the Labor Policy Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
the American Iron and Steel Institute, The Coalition of Management for Positive Employment, Training 
and Education, and the Council on Labor Law Equality. 
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concurring opinions, each of which articulated an interpretation that would protect a 
great number of EI structures. Unfortunately, these three interpretations were 
inconsistent with one another. The effect was to leave the current law in place, but 
demonstrate that the Board itself was confused as to how the law should be interpreted. 
Although the Board itself had raised expectations of a definitive ruling, ultimately 
it declined to rule upon the legality of EI structures generally.19 While providing some 
comfort, this produced even more confusion. 
Notably, the facts in Electromation do not appear typical of most EI structures. 
Its Action Committees were established in response to employee dissatisfaction with 
changes in human resources policies. Moreover, each Committee was formed to address 
a specific issue that was clearly or (at least arguably) a "condition of employment": 1) 
Absenteeism/Infractions; 2) No Smoking Policy; 3) Communication Network; 4) Pay 
Progression for Premium Positions; and 5) Attendance Bonus Program. 
Most EI structures are established to address broader issues of efficiency, quality, 
or health and safety. Their involvement in employment issues is incidental to those 
larger concerns. 
However, there are other facts in Electromation which are shared by many, if not 
most, EI structures. These structures are often unilaterally designed and established by 
management. In addition, while conditions of employment may not be the primary focus, 
EI structures frequently find discussion of them unavoidable. 
19 
"We find no basis in this record to conclude that the purpose of the Action Committees was 
limited to achieving 'quality' or 'efficiency' or that they were dt signed to be a 'communication device.' to 
promote generally the interests of quality or efficiency. We, therefore, do not reach the question of 
whether any employer initiated programs that may exist for such purposes, as described by amici in this 
proceeding, may constitute labor organizations under section 2(5)." Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 
163, at 17 n.28 (1992). 
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Moreover, Electromation made it clear that management's motives in establishing 
the EI structure are irrelevant, as long as the elements of Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) are 
present. 
DuPont. The Board quickly followed the Electromation decision with its decision 
in E.I. du Pont de Nemours &. Co.w Again, the facts were atypical in that they involved 
the establishment of EI structures — in this case health and safety committees — in a 
unionized setting without the union's blessing.21 In its decision, the Board attempted to 
clarify its Electromation ruling but, again, added to the confusion. One thing the case did 
seem to clarify was that a union has "veto power" over any EI structure involving workers 
it represents, if terms and conditions of employment are involved.22 
Pending Cases. Some have attempted to downplay the significance of 
Electromation and DuPont, highlighting their atypical facts and pointing to the few other 
cases that have emerged in the 13 months since Electromation was decided. We would 
311 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1993). 
21 
The DuPont case involved six safety committees and one fitness committee established by the 
company at its Chambers Works facihty in Deepwater, New Jersey. The committees had been preceded by 
safety and health committees run entirely by management personnel. The Administrative Law Judge found 
that the non-challenged safety and fitness committees had been established over a period from 1984 to 
1988 "in the same pattern" as the company's quality of work life committees. Employee members of the 
committees were selected by the company from among volunteers. The company felt that this would 
ensure the presence of "highly motivated and individually committed" individuals. 
It was not until 1989 that the union (Chemical Workers Association, Inc., International Brotherhood of 
DuPont Workers) made its own proposal for a site-wide joint health and safety committee, asserting that 
health and safety issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining. The union also demanded the abolition of 
the existing committees and urged its members to refuse to participate in them any longer. DuPont did not 
accede to the unions' demands, and the union filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board. 
Unfortunately, the Board did not state in the case that, had the same structures been 
established through the collective bargaining process, they would have been legal even though certain 
elements of employer "domination" existed {e.g., joint control of the committee and veto power over the 
committee's decisions). While most labor lawyers believe that the DuPont committees would have been 
safe had they been bargained, the Board's silence appears to invite further litigation to resolve that 
question. 
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like to think that this is indeed the case. Some might conclude that the "saving grace" in 
all of this is that the NLRA is a complaint-driven law and, as long as no one files a 
charge against an EI structure, it is safe. However, this provides little comfort to 
employers who conscientiously strive to maintain their operations in strict accordance 
with the law. 
Meanwhile, there are cases pending. This Commission heard testimony on 
January 5 about a case involving Polaroid. Also, a case is pending against NCR involving 
its Satisfaction Councils and Quality Information Councils.23 
In addition, a case recently decided by an administrative law judge concerns us 
because it does appear to represent a more typical set of facts. 
v. 
In Webcor Packaging Inc.,24 a strong disciple of employee involvement attempted 
to introduce EI in a plant after becoming vice-president for operations at the company in 
Burton, Michigan. His experience at one of Webcor's competitors had convinced him of 
the value of employee involvement. Thus, the company established an Employee 
Involvement Steering Committee, with employee representatives chosen by lot from 
volunteers. 
The Committee was told that it could only focus on quality, waste reduction, 
housekeeping, safety, and productivity. It was specifically ordered not to involve itself in 
"policy" issues, i.e., wages, work rules, hours of employment, etc. However, at the first 
two or three meetings, the employees repeatedly raised "policy issues" but were told they 
could not be discussed. The company realized that, with this restriction, the EI Steering 
23
 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 97, A-4 (May 21, 1993). 
24
 7-CA-31809 et ah, Oct. 28, 1993. 
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Committee was going nowhere, so it set up a Plant Council to deal only with "policy 
issues." 
An 8(a)(2) charge was filed by a union that had lost an organizing campaign 
among the workers and, adhering to Electromatton and Dupont, the Administrative Law 
Judge ordered the Plant Council disbanded. The ALT went to great lengths to explain 
that Webcor was not motivated by defeating the union, but was instead committed to 
"involving all of the people in our operation in thinking . . .[n]ot checking their brains at 
the door." 
We understand the company is appealing the case. This could provide the new 
Board, once it is confirmed, with an opportunity to take the law in a more flexible 
direction. 
Current State of the Law. In the meantime, the law remains inhibiting, even 
threatening, to employee involvement. For counsel to provide clients with a definitive 
delineation of what employers can and cannot do in this area is simply not possible. 
Electromation and Dupont have provided minimal guidance to employers and, if anything, 
have created more confusion. 
We do know, however, that there are certain pitfalls that, alone or in conjunction 
with other factors, can spell doom for an employer's EI efforts. A brief discussion of 
these follows: 
1) TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT: If an employer can purge 
his EI structures of consideration of any "terms and conditions of employment," those 
structures will be completely safe since they cannot be deemed "labor organizations." 
Unfortunately, the Board has defined "terms and conditions of employment" very 
broadly to include a great deal more than wages and hours. Thus, even though they may 
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play a crucial role in efficiency, productivity and quality, the following subjects could be 
argued to be forbidden: 
workplace health and safety; 
rewards for efficiency and productivity; 
work schedules; 
work assignments; 
work rules; 
job descriptions and classifications; 
production quotas; 
use of bulletin boards; 
v. 
work loads; 
changes in machinery; 
discipline; 
hiring & firing; and 
promotions and demotions. 
This means that, while management can decide such matters unilaterally, it may 
be unlawful to seek the input of employees in making the best decisions for the 
enterprise. As our clients know, it is virtually impossible to avoid touching these topics in 
the pursuit of efficiency and productivity. Meanwhile, as the Webcor case illustrates, it is 
often the employees themselves who want to focus on these issues. 
2) "BILATERAL" MECHANISM: The Board states that, for the critical 
component of "dealing with" under the definition of "labor organization" to exist, there 
must be a "bilateral mechanism." This is defined in DuPont as "a pattern or practice in 
which a group - employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management 
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responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and compromise 
is not required."25 
Consider what this means. If management merely listens to the employees but 
does absolutely nothing in response, there is no "bilateral mechanism" and there can be 
no violation. It is only when management seeks to address the employees' concerns — 
truly empowering them — that "bilateralism" exists and there can be a violation. We ask 
you, is this what Section 8(a)(2) was enacted to prevent? 
3) REPRESENTATION: The Board has failed to address whether employees in 
the EI structure must represent others for a "labor organization" to exist. 
"Representation" existed in both Electromation and Dupont so the Board found it 
unnecessary to address the question directly. Frankly, we were disappointed by the 
Board's unwillingness to address this issue. Moreover, we question how a group of 
individuals who do not "represent" other employees could be considered to meet anyone's 
definition of a "labor organization." 
Much of the confusion around this issue is based on a misunderstanding of the 
fundamental differences between collective bargaining and employee involvement. 
Collective bargaining had its origins in an adversarial relationship between 
management and the employees. In collective bargaining, the employees agree amongst 
themselves before communicating with management and present a single, unified voice to 
management on working conditions specifically. Individuals who may or may not even be 
employees aie selecled tu present these views on behalf of the group. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, at 2 (1993). 
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Employee involvement, on the other hand, is premised upon a cooperative 
relationship where it is recognized that the interests of the employees and management 
in the success of the enterprise are mutual. Thus, the focus of EI generally goes beyond 
terms and conditions of employment and is directed towards the broader issues of 
quality, efficiency, and productivity which are key components of competitiveness. 
Meanwhile, unlike collective bargaining, employees speak as individuals, since it is their 
own intellectual resources which are being tapped by the employer. In speaking as 
individuals, they may also reflect views they have gathered from discussions with other 
employees but, unlike collective bargaining, they are not presenting a single, unified 
"worker" voice. 
V. 
Thus, employee involvement and collective bargaining are rwo different 
phenomena. As this Commission has seen, in some settings they coexist and in others 
they don't. Significantly, experience has demonstrated that either can be very successful 
without the other. Thus, to those who would suggest that the presence of a union is 
essential for effective employee involvement, we simply would respond: employee 
involvement structures have functioned and do function effectively in thousands of 
workplaces without union participation. 
Hence, it would be a serious mistake tc conclude that EI should only exist where 
there is also collective bargaining. If, in fact, employees in an EI setting believe they also 
need collective bargaining, the law is already structured to provide them with that choice. 
4) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STRUCTURE: In both Electromation and 
Dupont, the fact that the structures involved were unilaterally established and configured 
by management was critical to the Board's finding of domination. 
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The underlying assumption appears to be that, when initiated by management, 
"employee involvement" is devoid of any employee choice — as distinguished from 
"collective bargaining" where employees elect a union to be their collective bargaining 
representative. However, EI is distinguishable from collective bargaining, not by the lack 
of employee choice, but by the existence of mutual choice. 
Any human resources manager who is an EI advocate will tell you that successful 
EI depends ultimately upon employee choice. If the employees do not believe in it, EI 
fails no matter how it is structured. Employees initially may resist new ways of operation 
that require them to take more responsibility for their work product. Case histories of 
EI successes often reflect such early resistance. If that resistance remains, EI doesn't 
v. 
work and the employer will likely abandon it. 
EI that is not chosen by management, however, also is subject to failure. Indeed, 
it is management who loses its decision-making power and once that power is given up, it 
is very difficult to take it back. Hence, management employees are often the most 
resistant to employee involvement. 
Because of this natural reluctance by both employees and management to 
abandon established ways of doing things, the impetus for EI frequently comes from the 
higher levels of the corporation—the CEO or a senior human resources vice president or 
manager. Unfortunately, this "top-down" genesis runs afoul of the Electromation 
principle that "labor organizations" (as defined by the Act and the Board) cannot be 
established by management, even if their success ultimately depends upon employee 
choice. 
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Thus, our advice to our clients must be that, to be safe, the EI structures must be 
initiated by the employees themselves. That sounds very appealing on paper, but, 
unfortunately, it seldom comes about that way. 
5) SAFE HARBORS: In Dupont, the Board attempted to provide some comfort 
to employers by listing certain "safe harbors." Unfortunately, these tend to be of a very 
primitive nature: 
• "brainstorming" sessions to develop, but not propose, ideas; 
• information sharing; 
• suggestion boxes; and, 
• conferences, where employees are encouraged to talk about their 
experiences. 
Again, it appears that employers may listen to their employees, but if they 
empower them, they are in trouble. 
As these "safe harbors" illustrate, there may be little our clients can do other than 
hope that a disgruntled employee or a union interested in organizing them does not file 
an NLRB charge. Even if what they are doing seems to be legal under the recent Board 
decisions — as with General Foods-type autonomous teams — the area is so confused 
that litigation is likely to result from any charge that is filed. 
Outlook. Certainly, the legal battle on this issue is far from over. Electromation is 
currently on appeal before the Seventh Circuit, which conducted oral argument last 
September. Meanwhile, Webcor and ensuing cases will continue to move forward. 
IT deed, the next Board to address the issue will be a completely new Board with 
most members appointed by President Clinton. Thus there may be reason to anticipate 
change, as several nominees/candidates for nomination have expressed the belief that the 
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law should provide greater latitude to employers in this area. Reform may be 
forthcoming, therefore, through Board and judicial ^interpretations of the existing 
statute. 
While lawyers continue to debate this issue before the NLRB and the courts, 
companies will continue to seek ways to enhance their competitiveness. Right now, some 
believe the legalities are ambiguous enough, and the chances of an NLRB order remote 
enough, that they are continuing their commitment toward employee involvement. 
However, as they hear more about the experiences of companies like Polaroid, NCR and 
Webcor, the chill may become more severe. Meanwhile, there are already internal 
conflicts in many companies between labor counsel and human resources managers as to 
how to respond. 
The recommended "cure" for these uncertainties takes varying forms, from change 
in the law through Board action to legislative reform. My own client, the Labor Policy 
Association (LPA), has testified before this Commission in support of legislation 
introduced by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-WI) — 
S. 669/H.R. 1259 — which would overturn Electromation. LPA strongly supports the 
goals of this legislation. 
The Working Group consensus, however, is that this Commission need not 
become embroiled in the legislative issue. Instead, we would urge the Commission to 
adopt the position reflected in the Group's consensus — that "Electromation should be 
clarified or changed to assure continued employee participation" — and to encourage the 
Administration to adopt policies which support this position. If an Administration policy 
is articulated with clarity, it should guide Congress and the Board in addressing the 
realities of the 1990's. Employee involvement is for the good of America. It should not 
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be undermined by a myriad of legal technicalities — whether through mandated 
approaches or the imposition of burdensome preconditions. Such "one size fits all" 
approaches contradict the flexibility and creativity essential to successful employee 
involvement. 
Employee involvement represents a consensus in our society which extends from 
the President to the shop floor. Government officials (including those in the current 
Administration), academics, business leaders and, most importantly, workers themselves 
have demonstrated their commitment to this new approach to work. We sincerely hope 
that your Commission will further the realization of this consensus by issuing a strong 
statement in its support. 
